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Abstract
We compare three forms of communication and punishment as incentives to increase contributions
to public goods in laboratory experiments. We ﬁnd, as in earlier experiments, that face-to-face com-
munication has very strong effects, but surprisingly that verbal communication through a chat room
preserving anonymity and excluding facial expression, etc. was almost as efﬁcient. Numerical com-
munication, via computer terminals, had no net effect on contributions or efﬁciency. Punishment, as
inearlierexperiments,increasedcontributionsbutbecauseofitscosthadlittleneteffectonefﬁciency.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In teams, ﬁrms and other groups, individuals are encouraged to undertake activities for
thecommongood.Oftenmanagersusevariousformsofcommunicationand/orpunishment
toreducethewell-knowntendencytofreerideonothers’contributions,andsubsequentloss
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of efﬁciency. Experimentalists and theorists have studied the free-rider problem in public
goods and common pool resource games, ﬁnding that various forms of communication and
sanctions can ameliorate this problem.
IsaacandWalker(1988)foundfreeformface-to-facecommunicationespeciallyeffective
in increasing contributions and efﬁciency, and Brosig et al. (2003) suggested the effective-
nessofface-to-facecommunicationmaybeduetocuesfromfacialexpression,toneofvoice,
body language, and removal of anonymity. In this paper, we have explored this explana-
tion by testing a free form version of text communication while preserving anonymity and
eliminating vocal and visual cues. As a further step toward narrowing communication, we
alsotestedastructuredformofnumericalcommunication,alsobycomputerterminal,elim-
inating verbal communication, while preserving anonymity. This form of communication
allowed nonbinding announcements of possible contribution levels that individuals could
make and immediately revise in response to others’ communication, in other words “cheap
talk.”
OurﬁrstquestionwaswhetherchatroomornumericalcheaptalkwouldfacilitateaNash
equilibrium with no contributions (as in the standard theory), or a Bayes–Nash equilibrium
withsignalingandsubstantialcontributions.Wefound,surprisingtous,thatverbalcommu-
nicationthroughachatroomwasonlyalittlelessefﬁcientthanface-to-facecommunication.
We also found, that the numerical communication had no net effect on contributions or
efﬁciency.
Asanotherincentivemechanism,Ostrometal.(1992)introducedsanctionsinacommon
pool resource experiment, and Fehr and G¨ achter (2000a) introduced a similar punishment
mechanism in a public goods experiment. In both experiments, punishment increased con-
tributions but efﬁciency much less so. One reason for the limited effect of punishment on
efﬁciency is well known—punishment is costly for both the punisher and the punished.1
In the experiment of this paper, we explored another, less well known, reason. In Fehr and
G¨ achter’s experiment most of the punishment was targeted at low contributors and became
an incentive to increase contributions, but some was targeted at high contributors. In our
experiment,wefoundthatasubstantialamountofpunishmentwastargetedatsubjectswith
higher than average contributions. A regression analysis conﬁrmed that this punishing of
high contributors, what we call “perverse punishment,” decreased the contributions of the
targeted high contributors.
In designing the experiment, we conjectured that opportunities to communicate and
punish might interact in ways such that each would enhance the effectiveness of the other.
Communicationmightimprovetheefﬁciencyofpunishmentbyallowingsubjectstoconvey
threats to punish low contributors. A punishment option might make cheap talk less cheap,
and communication might make punishment less necessary.
However, we found that verbal communication by itself increased cooperation so much
that the combined treatment of communication and punishment had only slightly higher
levels of contribution than either chat room or face-to-face communication alone, and the
difference was not statistically signiﬁcant for chat room only. Two of the three forms of
communication without punishment had higher earnings (and hence efﬁciency) than when
1 As an innovation in the punishment literature, Casari and Plott (2003) use sanctions in the form of ﬁnes, where
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combined with punishment, but in no case did adding punishment to a communication
treatment cause a difference in earnings signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Our ﬁndings are related to the literature as follows. The combined treatment of pun-
ishment and communication opportunities adds two degrees of freedom to the standard
voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) with neither opportunity. Ostrom et al. (1992)
found adding “a sword” to “a covenant,” (adding a sanctioning option to pre-play face-to-
facecommunication)themosteffectivewayofapproachingfullefﬁciencyintheircommon
pool resource experiments, of the treatments they studied. Their experiment differs from
ours and others in the VCM literature in having an interior optimum and no pre-announced
ending period (it has a randomly selected last period).
IsaacandWalker(1988)andSally’s(1995)reviewofthatpaperand36otherexperiments
foundthatnon-bindingface-to-facecommunicationfrequentlyledtocontributionsofentire
endowments. Brosig et al. (2003) found that both face-to-face communication and audio-
visual conferences among subjects seated in separated locations increased contributions
more than did audio communication only. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) found that
e-mail communications increased efﬁciency by less than face-to-face meetings. Wilson
and Sell (1997) allowed each subject to numerically announce his or her “intention” of
a contribution before making a binding contribution decision, and found little effect of
the announcement over a baseline without it. In Section 4 we discuss differences between
our communications treatments and those of Brosig et al., Frohlich and Oppenheimer, and
Wilson and Sell.
Fehr and G¨ achter (2000a) found that introducing a costly opportunity to punish tended
to increase average contribution levels from one period to the next, even when subjects
were re-matched in each period with other groups of subjects, and even in the last period.
They attributed the effectiveness of the punishment option to its permitting subjects with
a preference towards cooperation to punish free riders without reducing their own contri
butions. Similar experiments, including Carpenter (2000), Sefton et al. (2002), Masclet et
al. (2003), and Page et al. (2005), found that while contributions don’t always increase in
later periods, the baseline trend of decay was substantially mitigated.
Fehr and G¨ achter (2000a, b) suggested that experimental subjects may include a certain
fraction of “reciprocator” types in addition to the more standard payoff-maximizing types.
The reciprocator types repay kindness with kindness and unkindness with punishment. A
related notion is that of “assurance game preferences,” in which, following Sen (1967),
actual utilities in prisoners’ dilemma games differ from the material payoffs, leading to
increased cooperation.
The effectiveness of communication in our own and in other experiments suggests that
not all subjects have pay-off maximization as their only goal, and that many attach posi-
tiveprobabilitiestotheirfellowsubjectshavingnon-payoff-maximizingpreferencesand/or
entertaining the possibility of such preferences in others. High contributions and punish-
ments in the ﬁnal period of play suggest the presence of actual reciprocators (Andreoni and
Miller, 1993, Falk et al., 2001; Page et al., 2005). These experimental results appear to be
consistent with a Bayesian interpretation of VCMs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 speciﬁes our experimental design. Section 3
presents experimental results and analysis. Section 4 provides discussion and concludes the
paper. Further details are in our working paper (Bochet et al., 2005).14 O. Bochet et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 11–26
Table 1
Design of the eight experimental treatments
Without reduction option With reduction option
Baseline BR
3 sessions 3 sessions
4 groups of 4 each session 4 groups of 4 each session
Face to face FF FFwR
2 sessions 2 sessions
4 groups of 4 each session 4 groups of 4 each session
Chat room CR CRwR
3 sessions 3 sessions
4 groups of 4 each session 4 groups of 4 each session
Numerical cheap talk NCT NCTwR
3 sessions 3 sessions
4 groups of 4, 2 sessions 4 groups of 4, 2 sessions
3 groups of 4, 1 session 3 groups of 4, 1 session
2. Experimental design
We conducted 22 experimental sessions of eight treatments, as shown in Table 1. In each
session, 16 inexperienced subjects, drawn from the general undergraduate population at
Brown University, played a 10 period repeated VCM game in groups of four.2 Except in
the face-to-face (FF) treatment, subjects interacted only via computer terminals, and they
could not tell which other subjects were in their group.3
2.1. Baseline treatment (B)
Each of the treatments builds on the baseline treatment, which we describe ﬁrst. At the
beginning of each decision period of the baseline (B) treatment, each subject in a group of
fourwasprovided(electronically)with10experimentaldollarsandwasaskedtoallocateit,
in integer amounts, between a personal and a group account. Money placed in the personal
account accrued to the individual subject. In addition, each subject received 0.4 times the
total amount in his or her group’s account. Thus, the earnings of a subject, i,i nag i v e n
2 Exceptions are one NCT session and one NCTwR session, in which low show-up rates made it necessary to




A brief post-experiment debrieﬁng questionnaire shows that 16.1% of the subjects were economics concentrators,
a little more than the approximately 10% of all undergraduates at Brown who were in that concentration at
the time. 50.4% of subjects had taken one or more economics courses, with the average number of economics
courses taken being 1.3. Subjects were broadly drawn from all classes, from freshman to senior. 52.6% were
females.O. Bochet et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 11–26 15
period of treatments without punishments, are





of i’s group. After each group member made his or her contribution decision, each learned
ofthedecisionsoftheothersandofhisorherownearnings.Inthisandtheothertreatments,
eachindividual’sbindingdecisionsweremadeanonymouslywithinhisorhergroupbecause
these decisions were displayed to other group members under labels “you,” “B,” “C” and
“D” and the letter codes changed randomly from one period to the next. At the end of the
experiment,thesumofthe10periodsofearningswereconvertedintorealdollarsattherate
of US$ 0.13 per experimental dollar, and each subject was paid a US$ 5 participation fee.
Experiments lasted from one to one-and-three-quarter hours, and real earnings including
the participation fee averaged around US$ 25.
2.2. Reduction treatment (R)
The reduction treatment (R) is the same as baseline except for an added stage in each
period(intheinstructionsandmuchofwhatfollowsweuse“reduction”asthemoreneutral
term for “punishment”). After the assignment or contribution, subjects learned the assign-
ments to the group account of each other subject in their group (by their letter code). A
subject could then reduce the earnings of another subject at a 25 cent charge per one dollar
of earnings reduction. Each subject then learned her earnings for the period, which were
equal to her earnings from the assignment stage minus her charges for punishments minus
theamountbywhichherearningswerereducedbyothersubjects.Thus,earningsofsubject
i are, in a given period:










where Rij is the number of dollars by which i reduces j’s earnings. If this yielded a negative
number, earnings for the period were set to zero. The screen shot in Fig. 1 shows the format
for entering decisions. In this example, a subject typed in $5 for his contribution in box a,
then learned the others’ contributions, and then reduced B’s earnings by $2 in box b , and
reduced C’s and D’s by $3 and $4, respectively.
2.3. Face-to-face communication treatment (FF)
The face-to-face treatment (FF) is the same as B except that after the instruction period
and before any decisions are made, the members of each group of four have a chance to
talk for 5min, the only restrictions being that threats and promises of side-payments are
ruled out. Anonymity regarding group membership is lost, but after returning to their seats
individualsdonotknowwhichsubjectswithinagroupmadewhatdecisionbecausetheletter
codes change after each period. In addition to two FF sessions of our experiment without16 O. Bochet et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 11–26
Fig. 1. Example of decision screen.
punishment, we ran two face-to-face sessions with reduction (FFwR), see Table 1. Like
the FF treatment, the FFwR is the same as its no-communication counterpart R except that
group members could talk for 5min before beginning the decision portion of their session.
2.4. Chat room treatment (CR)
Thechatroom(CR)treatmentisthesameasBexceptthatgroupmemberswerebrought
together in an on-line chat room before the 1st, 4th, and 7th of the ten decision peri-
ods. In the chat room, they could discuss anything, except for restrictions against threats
and offers of side-payments, revealing one’s identity, and obscene language. Chat room
messages were monitored, and the monitor blocked the restricted messages, informing its
writer by a standard message (blocked messages were not frequent but not rare either). A
successfully sent message was seen by all members of the subject’s own group, but not
those in other groups, each of which had its own chat room. In chat room communica-
tion, the open-ended character of face-to-face communication is possible, but anonymity
is preserved, and it is more difﬁcult to signal emotional states due to the unavailability of
vocal intonation, facial expression, and body language. We carried out three sessions of
CR in our VCM (without punishment), and three sessions of CRwR (with reduction), see
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2.5. Numerical cheap talk treatment (NCT)
The numerical cheap talk treatment (NCT) is the same as B, except that at the beginning
of each period subjects had an opportunity to type in possible contribution levels. The
screen for doing this was the same as the one used for the later binding decisions, except
that the screen for this cheap talk stage was titled “Communication Stage.” Each subject
could then instantly overtype their possible contributions in response to others’ messages
until a ﬁxed amount of time ran out, and no more NCT messages were accepted. Then a
newscreenheadingappearedannouncingtheBindingDecisionStage,thenumericalentries
disappeared, and actual contribution decisions were entered.
In the treatment with numerical cheap talk and reductions (NCTwR), the subjects had
the opportunity to type in possible punishments as well as possible contributions, and
to revise their messages in response to others’ messages of possible contributions and
punishments. The screen for this stage was the same as Fig. 1, except for the differing
title of “Communication Stage.” After this stage was completed, the binding decision stage
of contribution and reduction followed, as in R treatment. We conducted three sessions of
numericalcheaptalkwithoutreduction(NCT),andthreesessionswithreduction(NCTwR).
A version of the full instructions for the experiment with the punishment option
and numerical cheap talk is shown in Appendix B (Supplementary data). The para-
graph of instructions speciﬁc to the FF and FFwR treatments is shown in Appendix C
(Supplementary data), while instructions speciﬁc to the CR and CRwR treatments are
shown in Appendix D (Supplementary data).
3. Results and analysis
Figs. 1 and 2 summarize the experiment’s results by graphing the trends in contributions
and earnings by period in our eight treatments. Results 1–3 below conﬁrm and strengthen
earlier results in the literature. Results 4–6 constitute the main new results of the paper.
3.1. Result 1
Ourbaselinetreatment(treatmentB)replicatedstandardﬁndings(DavisandHolt,1993;
Ledyard, 1995) that contributions begin at 50% or more of endowment, and decline with
repetition. Contributions began at an average of 62.9% of endowments, and declined to
19.6% of endowments in the last period (see Fig. 2 and Table 2). A regression of average
contributions on period (excluding period 10 to exclude the large end-game effect apparent
in all treatments) shows a statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on period, consistent
with an overall declining trend.
3.2. Result 2
Our VCM experiments with a punishment option but no communication (treatment R)
are consistent with others in ﬁnding: (a) higher initial contributions; (b) no decline in
contributions until the end of the experiment; and (c) the absence of an overall earnings18 O. Bochet et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 11–26
Fig. 2. Average contribution by period, sorted by treatment.
gain. Contributions began at an average of 69.6% of endowments, and the average was
slightly higher, at 70.9% of endowments, in periods 5–9, with a drop to 61.0% in period
10 (compared to 19.6% in period 10 of treatment B). A regression of average contributions
on period for periods 1–9 shows no signiﬁcant trend, so that while a fairly small end-game
effectappearedinperiod10,thepunishmentoptioneliminatedtheoveralldownwardtrendof
baselinecontributionsfoundinbaselineVCMexperiments,asinFehrandG¨ achter(2000a).
In a Mann–Whitney test we found that average contributions over the 10 periods taken
asawholeweresigniﬁcantlyhigher(p-value<0.01)inthetreatmentwithpunishmentsthan
in the baseline treatment. We use Mann–Whitney tests with the unit of observation group
Table 2
Average contribution to group account by period and treatment
B R FF FFwR CR CRwR NCT NCTwR
Period
1 6.29 6.96 10.00 10.00 9.33 9.42 6.57 6.43
2 7.02 7.12 10.00 9.97 8.69 9.15 6.18 6.68
3 6.79 6.94 10.00 10.00 7.75 9.50 6.07 7.39
4 5.65 6.77 10.00 9.69 9.42 9.71 4.84 6.18
5 4.58 7.37 9.69 10.00 8.31 9.87 5.14 7.29
6 4.81 7.15 10.00 9.53 6.92 9.79 4.82 6.61
7 4.54 6.75 10.00 10.00 9.00 9.96 3.98 6.41
8 3.56 7.12 9.69 9.75 8.96 10.00 3.91 6.89
9 2.33 7.06 9.06 9.87 7.83 9.79 3.39 7.50
10 1.94 6.10 7.81 8.94 5.21 8.75 1.95 5.84
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level averages across periods to avoid problems of statistical dependence. See our working
paper (2005) for further details.
As in Fehr and G¨ achter (2000a), there was a willingness to impose costly punishments
on other subjects’ earnings, with 83% of subjects imposing at least one punishment during
their ten period session. Also as in that experiment, punishments were aimed mainly at
low contributors. An analysis of changes in contributions shows that subjects tended to
increase their contribution following a punishment, if their contribution had been below the
groupmean.Thispatternofpunishmentandresponsehelpsexplainthehighercontributions
in the R treatment compared with B. As in Fehr and G¨ achter, contributions were higher
even in the ﬁrst period of the R treatment than in the ﬁrst period of the B treatment,
suggesting that subjects anticipated that low contributors may be punished, even before
they had seen evidence of it in the experiment. Finally, punishment was substantial in
the last period. Total dollars of punishments were signiﬁcantly higher in period 10 than
their average in periods 5–9, according to a Mann–Whitney test. This shows that some





while the reverse held for the B treatment. However, the costliness of punishing and being
punished led to no net gain in average earnings from introducing the punishment option in
ourexperiment(seeTable3).Notonlywereearningsreducedbythecostsofpunishingfree
riders, but also 22% of punishment events were targeted at a group’s highest contributor for
the period in question. In a regression analysis we found that high contributors who were
punished tended to reduce their contribution by $0.50 in period t+1 for every $1 by which
their earnings were reduced by punishment in period t.
We begin discussion of our communication results with treatment FF.
Table 3
Average earning by period and treatment
B R FF FFwR CR CRwR NCT NCTwR
Period
1 13.77 12.98 16.00 16.00 15.60 14.53 13.94 11.67
2 14.21 12.58 16.00 15.98 15.21 14.50 13.71 12.59
3 14.07 12.05 16.00 15.96 14.65 15.05 13.81 13.35
4 13.39 12.39 16.00 15.50 15.65 15.15 12.90 12.57
5 12.75 12.55 15.81 16.00 14.99 15.19 13.08 13.27
6 12.89 12.93 16.00 15.33 14.15 15.11 12.89 12.35
7 12.72 11.99 16.00 16.00 15.40 15.66 12.39 11.88
8 12.14 12.92 15.81 15.69 15.37 15.33 12.57 12.45
9 11.40 12.91 15.44 15.92 14.70 15.59 12.03 13.31
10 11.16 11.89 14.69 15.01 13.12 13.22 11.17 11.40
Average 12.85 12.52 15.77 15.74 14.88 14.93 12.84 12.4820 O. Bochet et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 11–26
3.4. Result 3
A 5-minute pre-play face-to-face communication period dramatically raised contribu-
tionstothegroupaccountinallperiodsrelativetotheircorrespondinglevelsintheBandR
treatments.AsshownbyFig.2andTable2,membersoftheeightgroupsintheFFtreatment
contributed their entire endowments in periods 1–4, 6, and 7; contributed more than 90% of
their endowments in periods 5, 8, and 9; and nearly 80% of their endowments in period 10.
Average contributions in the FF treatment exceed those in both the B and the R treatments
in every period and, comparing the FF and B treatments, in every group. Mann–Whitney
testsconﬁrmthatgroupsintheFFtreatmentcontributedandearnedsigniﬁcantlymorethan
groups in treatment B, and likewise, than groups in treatment R.
3.5. Discussion
The impact of communication on subjects’ decisions is inconsistent with predictions for
an environment of common knowledge of payoff-maximizing behavior, but consistent with
a world in which subjects assign some probability that their counterparts believe them to
havepreferencesforreciprocityand/ortruth-telling.That25outof32subjectscontinuedto
contribute their full endowments to the group account, even in period 10, strongly suggests
that many subjects actually have such preferences. A small number of subjects contributed
their full endowments in every period but the last, and nothing in the last. These subjects
may have feigned reciprocity for strategic reasons in the earlier periods, bailing out in the
last period when there was no further opportunity to inﬂuence others’ behavior; or these
subjects might have expected others to contribute little in the last period and not wanted
others free riding on their last period contribution.
3.6. Result 4
Open-ended but anonymous verbal communication in an on-line chat room was more
effective in eliciting contributions to the group account than were the B and R treatments
but less than face-to-face communication. The average contribution in the CR treatment
was 15% less than that in the FF treatment (see Fig. 2 or Table 2), and 30% higher than R.
(A two-tailed Mann–Whitney test ﬁnds contribution levels in CR signiﬁcantly lower than




Our results showed a chat room to be a surprisingly effective means of reaching an
agreement and engendering trust and commitment, a result which seems to augur well
for the conduct of business and other communications on-line. However, the fact that the
subject pool consisted entirely of students in a university of moderate size (about 5800
undergraduates)andthateachwasawareofthepresenceoftheother15subjectsintheroom
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of subjects’ messages shows that about a quarter of substantive messages are concerned
with discussion of what the best strategy would be (e.g.: “If we all keep putting in $10,
we’llallearn$16.”),withmostoftheremainingmessagesbeingstatementsofcommitment
to the common strategy (e.g.: “I’m with you, A.”), and morale and team-building remarks
(e.g.: “That was a breeze, let’s stick with this!”).
3.8. Result 5
The addition of a punishment option to face-to-face meetings did not signiﬁcantly alter
the high level of cooperation seen in this treatment, while it increased contributions only
moderately in the CR treatment. Overall, there are no statistically signiﬁcant differences in
either contributions or earnings among the FF, FFwR, and CRwR treatments, and the CR
treatment has only moderately lower contributions and earnings.4
“There were relatively high contributions in these treatments (see Fig. 2 or Table 2)
and the treatments that added a punishment option had little punishment in most groups.
Contributions and earnings among each of these four verbal communication treatments
were signiﬁcantly higher than those in the B treatment and in the R treatment, according to
our Mann–Whitney tests.”
3.9. Discussion
Perhaps surprisingly, the record of CRwR messages shows few subjects explicitly pro-
posed using punishments as a method of enforcement. Members of some groups even
seemed to see the punishment option as a trap set by the experimenters to help keep down
their earnings. Nevertheless, low contributors did tend to be punished. As shown in Table 2
and Fig. 2, there was an end game effect in all four verbal communication treatments, but
less so in the two that included a punishment option (FFwR and CRwR), suggesting that
the possibility of punishment deterred some free riding in the end game.
3.10. Result 6
The addition of numerical cheap talk did not result in additional cooperation.A s
Figs. 2 and 3 show, the NCT treatment has a declining trend in contributions and earnings
very similar to baseline. As shown in Table 2 the opportunity of communication by numer-
ical cheap talk leads to slightly lower average contributions than baseline (Mann–Whitney
tests ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference (p-values >0.10) between the two treatments in either
contributions or in earnings). In a corresponding way, Figs. 2 and 3 show that the NCTwR
treatment has a stability of contributions and earnings through period 9 very similar to the
R treatment alone. Again the differences in average contribution and earnings are slight,
and Mann–Whitney tests ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference between the two treatments in con-
tributions or in earnings. As shown in Table 2, like the R treatment, overall contributions
4 According to Mann–Whitney tests using group-level observations, contributions are lower in the CR than in
the FF, FFwR and CRwR treatments, signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 5% levels, respectively. The same type of
tests show earnings to be indistinguishable in the CR and CRwR treatments, and lower in the CR than in the FF
and FFwR treatments, signiﬁcant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.22 O. Bochet et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 11–26
Fig. 3. Average earnings by period, sorted by treatment.
in the NCTwR treatment were higher than those in the NCT and B treatments (because
contributions were more sustained over time). Table 3 shows that, like the R treatment,
earnings were lower in the NCTwR treatment than in the NCT and B treatments, although
the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. Earnings in the NCTwR treatment were also
lower than in the FF, FFwR, CR, and CRwR treatments, and signiﬁcantly so.
3.11. Discussion
The similarity of the average net outcomes of the NCT and NCTwR treatments to their
counterparttreatmentswithoutcommunication,BandR,isconsistentwiththeexpectations
of standard economic theory that communication is simply “cheap talk” when there is
common knowledge that subjects are payoff maximizers. But a closer inspection of NCT
messages and behaviors shows that most subjects attempted to achieve coordination on
high-contribution equilibria, using the threat of punishment to enforce this in the NCTwR
treatment. Consistent with this, some groups achieved higher levels of cooperation in the
NCT and NCTwR treatments than in their counterpart B and R treatments. What accounts
for the absence of an overall effect is the fact that in other groups, subjects attempted to
use misleading NCT messages to generate opportunities to free ride. The latter NCT and
NCTwR groups achieved even poorer outcomes than did low-end performers in the B and
R treatments.5
5 We explore the richness of NCT interactions in a companion paper (Bochet and Putterman, 2005).O. Bochet et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 11–26 23
4. Discussion and conclusion
The frequent instances of contributions and punishment are inconsistent with solution
concepts of iterated dominance and subgame perfect Nash equilibria but they are consistent
withBayes–NashequilibriaasformalizedinsimplerrepeatedgamesbyKrepsetal.(1982),
McKelveyandPalfrey(1992),andGuttman(2000).ThesemodelshaveBayesianequilibria
with high initial cooperation with an end-game fall off similar to the behavior observed in
this and other VCM experiments in the recent literature.
Last period contributions in face-to-face and chat room treatments without punishment
suggest that some subjects have other preferences besides monetary payoff maximization,
forexamplealtruism,reciprocity,ordisutilityfromrenegingonanagreement.Theobserved
last period punishments in treatments with the punishment option also suggest other pref-
erences besides payoff maximization, for example, revenge for having been made a sucker,
or “negative reciprocity” (Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000b).
Both contributions and earnings were considerably higher in the four treatments (FF,
FFwR, CR, and CRwR) with open ended communication than in those with punishment
but without such communication. Adding a punishment option to a verbal communication
treatment(FForCR)eitherdidnotraisecontributions(FF)ordidsoonlymoderately(CR).
In fact in CRwRand FFwRmost subjects shied away from explicit threats in their commu-
nications,preferringtocultivateaharmoniousatmosphereofcooperationbyagreementand
notthreat.6 Theeffectivenessofsuchverbalandtechnicallynon-bindingagreements—even
without face-to-face communication—is one of the most impressive results to emerge from
our analysis.
Our experimental design differs somewhat from that of Wilson and Sell and we have
somewhat different results in our treatments with numerical cheap talk. In their design the
numerical announcements of “intended” contribution were made simultaneously and only
oncewithineachperiod.Thustherewasnoopportunitytorespondtoothers’cheaptalkand
attempt coordination within a period. We allowed rapid response and revision at the begin-
ning of each period, and there was frequent response and revision. When numerical cheap
talk was combined with a punishment option there were many cheap talk threats of pun-
ishment and cheap talk responses with higher cheap talk contributions. We found attempts
to coordinate, leading some groups to have substantially higher average contributions with
cheap talk than did the most cooperative baseline groups, which had no possibility of com-
munication.Butwealsofoundmanyinstanceswherethebindingdecisionsofcontributions
(and punishment) differed from the cheap talk, leading to lower average contributions than
in the least cooperative baseline groups. It appeared that there was increased coordination
in some groups and increased cynicism in others, offsetting each other; in any case, the net
effect of numerical cheap talk was small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Unlike numerical signaling, verbal communication allows subjects to issue explicit pro-
fessions of commitment and to try to convince one another that they will not renege on
6 Thedifferencebetweencooperationachievedby‘friendly’agreementandthatbroughtaboutunderthepressure
of threats is also illustrated by comparing the ﬁnal period of the FF and CR treatments, discussed in this paper,
with those of an “expulsion” experiment reported in Cinyabuguma et al. (2005). In the latter, contributions fell
from an average of about 90% in the next-to-last period to about 20% in the last one.24 O. Bochet et al. / J. of Economic Behavior & Org. 60 (2006) 11–26
their commitments. We found these efforts to be largely successful. Sally (1995) found
communication to have a statistically and economically stronger effect on cooperation
than any other treatment variable in a large set of VCM experiments. Our study has
expanded the already large universe of treatments studied by Sally by adding numeri-
cal cheap talk and chat room communication. The failure of our NCT treatments and
the success of our CR treatments provide qualitatively new support for Sally’s conclu-
sion that “the speciﬁc medium of language may be an essential factor in inﬂuencing
behavior.”
The observed high levels of cooperation in our CR treatments differ somewhat from
other ﬁndings on communication without visual and/or vocal dimensions, but there are also
differences in the experimental set ups. Brosig et al. (2003) compared a no communica-
tion baseline to one in which subjects could communicate by an audio channel but not
see one another. It seems surprising that that treatment led to only slightly more cooper-
ation than did their baseline. However, Brosig et al. went to great lengths to isolate their
subjects from one another, whereas our subjects sat in the same room in every treatment,
includingCR.7 FrohlichandOppenheimer(1998)foundsubstantiallyandsigniﬁcantlyless
cooperation with e-mail communication than with face-to-face communication. But e-mail
communication requires opening messages one by one without a running record of the
communications.8
In conclusion, communication of (non-binding) promises permitted high efﬁciency lev-
els to be achieved in our two verbal communication treatments. Observed reciprocity
seemed to foster an atmosphere of cooperation from which many did not want to uni-
laterally defect. Without a vehicle for proclaiming commitments, numerical cheap talk
lacked this effect. In treatments with monetary punishment opportunities but without ver-
bal communication, higher contributions were elicited by fear of punishment, but these
contributions were not as high as those following verbal communication, and they were
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